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Abstract
Objective: The study examines the relationship between the primary care model that a physician belongs to and
the efficiency of the primary care physician in Ontario, Canada.
Methods: Survey data were collected from 183 self-selected physicians and linked to administrative databases to
capture the provision of services to the patients served for the 12 month period ending June 30, 2013, and the
characteristics of the patients at the beginning of the study period. Two stochastic frontier regression models were
used to estimate efficiency scores and parameters for two separate outputs: the number of distinct patients seen
and the number of visits.
Results: Because of missing data, only 165 physicians were included in the analyses. The average efficiency was
0.72 for both outputs with scores varying from 4 % to 93 % for the visits and 5 % to 94 % for the number of
patients seen. We observed that there were both very low and very high efficiency scores within each model.
These variations were larger than variations in average scores across models.
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Background
Concerns over growing health care expenditures have led
to interest in increasing the efficiency of health care pro-
viders, particularly in developed countries such as Canada
[1]. Canada has a single-payer, publicly financed, universal
health insurance system whereby all medically necessary
services are provided free at the point of service. The sys-
tem is highly decentralized with health care being a provin-
cial jurisdiction. The majority of primary care has been
delivered by primary care physicians in solo or group prac-
tices who were traditionally remunerated on a fee-for-
service basis [2]. Since the early 2000s, there has been a
shift in the organization and payment of primary care phy-
sicians, with Ontario considered the province to have
introduced the largest number of alternative payment struc-
tures [3].
Various factors can affect the efficiency of primary care
physicians, including remuneration methods and the
organizational characteristics of the primary care practice,
as well as the nature of the outputs measured. Over the
past fifteen years, primary care in Ontario has been trans-
formed away from almost exclusively fee-for-service to-
wards mixed payments and new models of organization
with interdisciplinary teams. The mixed payment mecha-
nisms for physicians combine capitation, fee-for-service
and incentive payments for the delivery of preventive ser-
vices. The new primary care models also feature group and
interdisciplinary teams, enrollment of patients with the
physicians, and after-hours access requirements.
For the purpose of this study, Ontario primary care
models are categorized as: Fee-for-Service (FFS); Family
Health Group (FHG); blended capitation; Family Health
Teams (FHTs); and salaried models. All but the FFS and
salaried models include incentives to enroll patients and
have requirements for after-hours care. Salaried
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physicians also practice in an interdisciplinary team-
based environment.
The FFS model is defined by remuneration of phy-
sicians for each service provided, as determined by
the schedule of benefits (SoB). FHG physicians are
also remunerated mostly on a FFS basis, but a FHG
must include at least three physicians. FHG physi-
cians have incentives to enroll their patients: they
receive a payment for each enrolled patient and
bonus payments for achieving targets on cancer
screening and chronic disease management for eli-
gible enrolled patients. They also have requirements
for after-hours care, i.e., that the clinic be opened
on evenings and weekend days. In this study, FFS
physicians are separated from FHG physicians be-
cause of these structural and payment differences.
Capitated physicians work in groups with a mini-
mum of three physicians. The capitation rate covers
a basket of primary care services and is adjusted for
age and sex of patients. Physicians are remunerated
through FFS for other services and they receive 15 %
of the fees for services included in the capitation
rate. It is estimated that about 60 % of their reve-
nues come from capitation payments [4].
A FHT is a group of capitated physicians who re-
ceive supplemental funding from the Ontario Ministry
of Health and Long Term Care (MOHLTC) to hire
additional health care providers (such as nurses, social
workers, dietitians, and pharmacists) and to create an
interdisciplinary team. The choice of providers is
meant to reflect the needs of the community served
by the FHT.
Efficiency can be defined as the relationship be-
tween the observed ratio of outputs to inputs of a
unit (such as a physician), compared to an optimal
ratio. The optimal ratio is defined by the maximum
output that could be produced with the same quantity
of inputs or to the fewest inputs that could be used
to produce the same level of output [5, 6]. Hence, ef-
ficiency depends on both the outputs and inputs
chosen. Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) is the most
commonly used regression based approach to effi-
ciency measurement.
The purpose of the present study is to identify the ef-
fect of the primary care model on a physician’s effi-
ciency. The first part of the paper provides the
framework for the measurement of efficiency. This is
followed by the identification of the data and the design
of the study. We then provide the results including a de-
scription of the characteristics of physicians and patients
across models, the efficiency scores of physicians and
the estimates of the effect of primary care models on ef-
ficiency. Finally, the paper discusses the implications of
the results for health care policy.
Payments mechanisms, physician behavior and a
framework to measure efficiency
Payers have experimented with various methods to pay
physicians, each method having incentives that could
affect physicians’ behaviors in different directions.
Physicians paid on a FFS-basis have an incentive to
provide more visits [7, 8] and this may be at the expense
of conducting out-of-visit activities for which they do
not receive any remuneration. Incentives to increase
volumes was found to lead physicians to increase what
Gaynor & Pauly termed “effort” [9], i.e. working longer
hours, yet without improving efficiency. FFS physicians
may also shorten the duration of consultations [10],
leading to what some call the “one problem per visit”
policy [11]. Hence, physicians receiving payment
through FFS are expected to produce more services than
physicians paid by blended capitation or salary. A review
of payment methods also found that FFS physicians were
more likely to provide elective procedures, supporting
the idea of over-supply of services [12]. Their efficiency,
however, may be similar to physicians in other payment
methods, when considering the actual number of hours
spent on direct patient care and controlling for the dur-
ation of the visits and other factors that could affect the
production of services.
Physicians paid on a capitation basis have a differ-
ent incentive: rather than maximizing services, their
incentive is to maximize the number of patients en-
rolled with them. The capitation rates in Ontario are
reduced for each patient beyond 2,400, meaning that
there is diminishing marginal returns at that point. If
physicians were trying to maximize profits, they
would enroll patients until the marginal revenue no
longer exceeds to marginal cost of treating a patient.
To take on larger panel sizes, physicians may shift
care by making more frequent referrals to specialists
[13–17]. But they also have an incentive to find effi-
ciencies within their organizational practices by work-
ing with other health care providers and using them
as substitutes [18]. Under capitation, physicians re-
ceive the same monthly capitation payment per pa-
tient regardless of the number of visits a patient
makes. If payments are not fully adjusted for the ex-
pected health care needs of the patients, physicians
may “cherry-pick” patients expected to have a lower
utilization than the capitation rate accounts for [17].
The Ontario capitation rates are only age and sex ad-
justed, which was found to lead to over-compensation
for healthier and wealthier patients and under-
compensation for patients of lower income and higher
morbidity burden [19]. However, the two Ontario pri-
mary care models that use capitation as their basis
for physician remuneration also include FFS and per-
formance incentives, which were intended to reduce
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the “pathologies” associated with prospective payment
[20] and could lead to higher efficiency.
Salary payment is seen as a disincentive to productivity
[20]. In Ontario, salary payment was associated with
lower productivity but higher quality of care [21, 22].
However, in the UK, a switch towards salary did not
affect physicians’ productivity or quality of care com-
pared to physicians paid on FFS or on capitation [23]. A
review of empirical studies on payment methods sug-
gests that the effect of salary on physician behavior is
not conclusive [24] while another review found that pa-
tients of salaried physicians were more satisfied with ac-
cess compared to those of FFS physicians [8].
The measure of efficiency relies on determining the re-
lationships between inputs and outputs, and their selec-
tion generally depends on the context and the
perspective taken. A private primary care organization
may be interested in the allocation of its resources to
optimize outputs. As the organization pays for the remu-
neration of physicians, other employees, as well as office
space and equipment, it considers all of these inputs in
the production of services. Using the revenues generated
as the measure of outputs in relation to the costs of de-
livering services would be aligned with an aim of maxi-
mizing profits [25–27].
From the perspective of a public health care insurance
provider such as the Ontario government, the aim is to
improve access to health care services by the population.
Outputs include the number of primary care visits and
the number of people served, which are both commonly
used, in studies examining productivity and efficiency of
primary care providers [21, 28–31]. In Ontario, the re-
muneration of primary care physicians is meant to cover
the operational costs (rent, administrative staff, etc.) of
delivering services as well as physician time. The mix of
administrative staff and other types of health care
providers in a practice is also highly linked to the pri-
mary care model. For example, most salaried physi-
cians worked in an interdisciplinary environment that
employs registered nurses and nurse practitioners and
so do FHTs.
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework applied in
the present study. It considers the number of hours that
physician spend on direct patient care as the input in
the production of services.
Health care services in general are very labor intensive
which is aligned with the use of physicians as the main
inputs in the primary care efficiency literature [21, 27,
32–34]. The measure of physician input varies across
studies and appears to simply reflect availability of data
in choosing a full-time equivalent (FTE) count or the
number of weekly hours worked; the latter being more
precise, but neither specifying the time spent on direct
patient care. Both these approaches assume that all of a
physician’s work time is spent on direct patient care. Yet
primary care physicians spend over 20 % of their work-
day on patient care activities outside of office visits,
which in part substitute for visits, and play an important
role in the coordination of care [35, 36]. Because the
outputs from the time spent on these activities cannot
be measured, it is logical to exclude that time from the
input as well. In addition, the time that physicians spend
on such activities may vary across payment models.
The environment and the practice style of a physician
may also affect the outputs. The environment is consid-
ered here as an organizational environment with the pri-
mary care model and the geographic location, with
rurality. How a physician works in terms of the dura-
tions of short and long visits and the percentage of long
visits are considered process measures. In addition to
Fig. 1 Conceptual Framework of the Primary Care Physicians Production of Services
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the practice characteristics, patient characteristics such
as specific diseases and the number of chronic diseases
were found to affect the production of services [37].
Methods
Data and variables
The sample for the study included all 183 physician re-
spondents to the Quality and Costs of Primary Care
(QUALICOPC) study in Ontario. Data were collected
between January and July 2013. QUALICOPC is an
international study that included 34 countries. In each
country, the same set of four surveys was used to collect
data about practice characteristics, physician perceptions
of care, patient perceptions of care, and patient values,
with only minor changes to accommodate the specific
realities of the local health care system [38, 39]. In On-
tario, recruitment was conducted in collaboration with
the Ontario College of Family Physicians. The College
included a recruitment announcement in their newslet-
ter that was sent to all primary care physicians in the
province - over 13,000 [40]. Interested physicians con-
tacted the research team at the University of Toronto
and those meeting eligibility criteria were sent a survey
package (n = 229). Of those, 183 physicians completed and
returned the survey package. Only one physician per
practice was eligible to participate in order to maximize
the number of practices involved. There was a CAD200
incentive for participants to cover costs of disruption to
the practice. The sample included physicians in an array
of models including: FFS (10 %), FHG (22 %), FHT (31 %),
blended capitation (30 %) and salaried (6 %). These groups
were treated as mutually exclusive, and so the blended
capitation group excluded physicians working in FHTs.
In comparison, the distribution of family physicians in
Ontario is currently as follows: 20.5 % in FHGs, 42 % in
blended capitation, 22 % in FHTs, with the remaining
in other models including salaried and FFS [41].
Data for this study included elements of the Practice
and Physician Surveys from QUALICOPC linked with
health administrative databases, and also census data
held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences
(ICES) at the University of Toronto. QUALICOPC par-
ticipants were asked to provide their Ontario Health In-
surance Plan (OHIP) billing numbers, which were used
to link to patient visits in the OHIP database. Based on
the physician’s billing number, a dataset at the patient
level was built, using each patient’s own ICES Key Num-
ber (IKN) to link with health care utilization. Utilization
included both outpatient and inpatient from the OHIP
database and hospital databases, including the Discharge
Abstract Database (DAD) and the National Ambulatory
Care Reporting System (NACRS). From this patient level
dataset and data from the QUALICOPC survey, a phys-
ician level dataset was constructed for use in the SFA.
The present study considers two physician outputs
that are common in the literature [21, 28–32, 34]: the
number of distinct patients seen and the number of
visits, from the OHIP database. The outputs were ad-
justed with the average duration of a long consultation,
the average duration of a short consultation and the per-
centage of long consultations, reported by physicians in
the QUALICOPC survey. The input was the number of
weekly hours spent on direct patient care as reported by
physicians in the QUALICOPC survey.
Patient characteristics included socio-economic sta-
tus with the average income quintile from the Census
database, average age, percentage of female patients,
and health status. Health status was measured using
the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Group® (ACG®)
weight [42].
The analyses also adjusted for a rural location of the
practice, which was reported by physicians in the survey.
Analytical approach
This is a cross-sectional study assessing the efficiency of
Ontario primary care physicians across different primary
care models using the SFA method. With the SFA
method, efficiency is determined in relation to a
production frontier, which is itself based on the actual
productivity of physicians observed in the study sample
as measured in terms of both patients seen and number
of visits respectively in each estimated efficiency model
[43, 44]. This method has the benefit of assessing the ef-
fect of covariates on the efficiency scores [30, 45].
The SFA approach requires specifying a form of the
production function, which is typically a Cobb-Douglas
or a more general translog form. The error term ei in
the regression model for a producing unit i is composed
of two components: inefficiency and noise: ei = ui + vi
[46]. We used a one-step approach in which coefficients
on explanatory variables and efficiency scores are esti-
mated jointly. The explanatory variable set includes
dummies corresponding to each of the primary care
models as well as other variables on the level of output.
Because the Cobb-Douglas is easier to interpret and
requires the estimation of fewer parameters, it is pre-
ferred to the translog. However, the translog is used
when the assumption of unitary substitution elasticities
required for the Cobb-Douglas does not hold. Both
forms of the production function were generated. The
test failed to reject the null hypothesis of a Cobb-
Douglas model and the Cobb-Douglas was selected.
Two distinct Cobb-Douglas production functions were
estimated, one for each of the two outputs: the number
of patients seen in one year and the number of visits in
one year. Each physician’s productivity was determined
by the quantities of inputs utilized and the volumes of
outputs produced. Efficiency scores were then estimated
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for each physician. Input and output variables were log-
transformed such that:
ln yi ¼ β’ ln xi þ vi– ui ð1Þ
Where:
ln yi is the logarithm of the output (the number of pa-
tients seen or the number of visits) by physician i; β’ is
the vector of the parameters to be estimated; ln xi is a
vector of the logarithm of the inputs; vi is statistical
noise, which can be positive or negative and is assumed
to follow a normal distribution centered at zero; ui is
productive inefficiency. Productive inefficiency is non-
negative, with either a half-normal, truncated, or expo-
nential distribution. Likelihood ratio tests were con-
ducted to determine the appropriate distribution, as
suggested by Rosko [45] and the exponential distribution
was chosen. The two parts of the disturbance, i.e., statis-
tical noise v and productive inefficiency u, should be in-
dependently distributed.
From [1], the efficiency (E) of physician i can be de-
fined as:
Ei ¼ qi
exp x0iβ þ vi




exp x0iβ þ vi
 
¼ exp −uið Þ ð2Þ
The E of a physician corresponds to the quantity pro-
duced (number of patients seen or visits in one year) di-
vided by the expected quantity of output, with the given
inputs and the statistical noise.
Statistical analyses were conducted with STATA© ver-
sion 13. This study received approval from the Research
Ethics Board of the University of Toronto.
Results
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample
overall and for the primary care models. Out of the 183
primary care physicians participating in the survey, ten
were removed because of missing or very limited data
on visits (<10 measured visits for the physician). Half of
the physicians excluded were from salaried models and
specifically Community Health Centres (CHCs). CHC
physicians do not directly bill OHIP and claims records
are not generated which reduced the number of salaried
physicians from 11 to 6. In addition, 8 observations were
excluded because participants did not answer all the
questions in the survey, and the result was missing data
for some of the study variables. The number of observa-
tions for which data were available is indicated for each
variable and primary care model in Table 1. The model
specification for the SFA was adjusted by removing vari-
ables with substantial missing data (variable on FTE
counts of providers in the physician practice), and the
final statistical model included 165 physicians.
Mean efficiency scores for all physicians and ac-
cording to primary care model are reported in Table 2.
The average efficiency score was 0.722 when using the
number of visits as the output and 0.724 when using the
number of patients seen as the output. On average, pri-
mary care physicians are operating at about 72 % effi-
ciency for each output measure, with a wide variation in
the scores from 4 % to 93 % for the visits and 5 % to
94 % for the number of patients seen. One of the lowest
efficiency scores was of one salaried physician who had
45 visits and who was identified as an outlier when
examining physician outputs prior to conducting the
SFA. However, this outlier could not be excluded from
the reported analyses because ICES requires a minimum
of 6 units and excluding it would have brought the num-
ber of salaried physicians to 5. However, analyses were
conducted without the outlier physician. Removing the
outlier did affect the results in that the coefficients on the
salaried physicians changed and became insignificant on
the models for each of the outputs (Table 3). Efficiency
analyses can be substantively affected by the presence of
outliers, which is why we tested the sensitivity of our
results to outliers.
Table 3 reports the results from the SFA, using the
number of visits in the first column and the number of
patients seen in the second column. Analyses were run
with other model specifications that included more vari-
ables such as the number of consultation rooms, differ-
ent measures of patient health status and socioeconomic
status, and the results were consistent.
Because the choice of the distribution of the error
term can be arbitrary, each of the three common distri-
butions used for SFA models, i.e., half-normal (which is
the default), exponential, and truncated was run. They
were tested with the likelihood-ratio test to select the
distribution with the better fit, and the exponential dis-
tribution was selected.
The first analysis used the number of visits as the out-
put. In this model, the coefficients on the primary care
model variables show that the number of visits is signifi-
cantly lower for physicians in blended capitation models
and interdisciplinary teams (22.8 % and 25.5 % respect-
ively), as compared to FFS physicians, controlling for pa-
tient characteristics and location. The other variables
that were significantly associated with lower productivity
were: the longer mean duration of a regular consultation
and the proportion of long consultations, a higher aver-
age income quintile of the patient population, and a
higher percentage of females in the physician’s patient
population. The average duration of a long consultation
was not significant.
Similar results were found when using the number of
patients seen as the output. In this case, physicians paid
on the basis of blended capitation and salary had a lower
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output, and the physicians from the other models, i.e.,
FHG and FHT, had outputs that were not significantly
different from those of FFS physicians. Longer durations
of a regular consultation and of a long consultation and
a higher percentage of long consultations were associ-
ated with lower levels of output. The number of patients
seen decreased with a higher average age of patients and
with a higher average income quintile of patients.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of
the primary care models on the efficiency of physicians.
Efficiency is largely driven by the quantity of services
produced by physicians but also determined by the ap-
proach to measure the inputs and the outputs, as well as
other factors that may affect the quantities of outputs
produced.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for the sample overall and by primary care model








n Mean (sd) n Mean (sd) n Mean
(sd)
n Mean (sd) n Mean (sd)
Dependent Variables




































40 42.4 (12.7) 54 37.7 (9.0) 9 38.3 (5.3) 54 38.9 (11.2) 18 38.1 (14.0)
Hours of direct care 181 32.5
(10.6)
22 35.4 (8.8) 40 32.9 (12.9) 53 30.2* (10.0) 10 32.7 (5.4) 55 32.3 (9.7) 16 33.2 (12.1)
Average regular consult
duration
183 14.7 (4.9) 22 16.4 (7.0) 40 13.5 (4.8) 54 13.4* (3.7) 10 21.8*
(6.2)
56 14.4 (3.6) 18 18.2 (7.1)
Average long consult
duration
182 31.3 (9.4) 22 34.9
(12.7)
39 28.8* (9.3) 54 29.6* (7.8) 10 41.5
(11.1)







39 20.5 (11.9) 54 16.9 (8.3) 10 19.0
(18.8)
53 18.2 (9.8) 13 17.8 (14.0)
Percent rural practices 171 12.0 14 18.2 39 5.1 52 5.6* 10 50.0 54 8.9 13 12.5
# of consult rooms 183 21.1
(10.2)
22 19.2 (9.8) 40 22.2 (9.9) 54 22.8 (9.7) 10 24.1
(10.8)
56 18.9 (10.6) 18 20.9 (9.0)
Patient characteristics











% patients female 174 58.9 17 55.9 40 59.6 54 59.6 6 55.6 56 58.8 9 59.2
Average patient age 174 42.8 (6.7) 17 45.9 (8.5) 40 39.7**
(5.9)
54 43.3 (5.5) 6 49.6
(11.2)
56 43.4 (6.3) 9 43.6 (9.8)
Average income quintileb 174 3.1 (0.5) 17 3.0 (0.5) 40 3.0 (0.5) 54 3.2 (0.4) 6 2.5 (0.6) 56 3.1 (0.5) 9 3.2 (0.5)
Percent IQ 1 174 17.6 17 20.7 40 19.2 54 16.3 6 28.9 56 18.2 9 13.9
Percent IQ 2 174 18.8 17 18.5 40 19.0 54 17.8 6 26.4 56 18.5 9 24.1
Percent IQ 3 174 19.0 17 18.4 40 20.2 54 18.9 6 14.6 56 19.1 9 16.6
Percent IQ 4 174 22.1 17 21.2 40 22.3 54 22.2 6 20.1 56 21.6 9 19.8
Percent IQ 5 174 22.1 17 19.6 40 19.1 54 24.5 6 7.8 ** 56 22.1 9 25.6
Indicates a significant difference compared to FFS at *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
aThe estimated panel was self-reported by physicians in the QUALICOPC survey. The correlation with the number of patients seen and the number of visits
indicated was examined and showed low correlation (0.41). A separate SFA was conducted using the estimated panel to test as the output, and the results
were consistent
bVarious ways of adjusting for the socio-economic status of patients were tested. The results were consistent across specifications, and the average income
quintile was selected to limit the number of explanatory variables. The distribution is reported in this descriptive table in order to provide more specific
information about the characteristics of the patients in each model
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As expected, the number of visits and the number of
patients seen were higher amongst FFS and FHG physi-
cians (Table 1). These results are consistent with the
theoretical and empirical literature [7, 47–49]. As men-
tioned earlier, physician paid through FFS have an incen-
tive to conduct more visits to generate higher income
and they can choose to do so by increasing the hours
that they spent on direct patient care [9] and/or decrease
the time spent per visit [10].
The framework that we developed for this study
controlled for some differences in the practice style of
physicians and notably, the duration of the visits, and
the time that is actually spent on direct patient care.
Some of these differences did follow, to a certain ex-
tent, the primary care model. For instance, capitated
physicians spent fewer hours on direct patient care
compared to FFS physicians. FFS physicians worked
the longest hours, including the hours spent on direct
patient care, which is consistent with evidence that
FFS physicians work longer hours [50]. The payment
mechanisms may drive physicians to adopt specific
practice styles. It may also be that physicians select to
practice in a primary care model where the payment
incentives align with their preferred practice style.
Many observed differences were not statistically sig-
nificant, likely because of the small sample size. Even
though not significant, there are differences between
FFS and FHG physicians which are surprising, given
the similarities in the payments, as most of the remu-
neration to FHGs come from FFS payments. FHG
physicians serve significantly healthier and younger
patients than FFS physicians. FHG physicians also
have visit durations that are similar to those of capi-
tated physicians and shorter than FFS physicians.
Only salaried physicians have longer visits. Salaried
physicians serve patients in poorer health and from
Table 3 SFA results with an exponential distribution




Blended Capitation −0.228b −0.191c
Salaried Models −0.310 −0.372c
FHT −0.255a −0.084
Rural −0.133 −0.066
Ln(hours spent on direct care) 0.213a 0.187b
Patient Characteristics
Ln (average income quintile) −0.446c −0.461c
Ln(average age) 0.166 −1.133a
Ln(percent female) −0.545c −0.408
Ln(average ACG) 0.062 0.151
Consult Time
Ln(Percent long consult) −0.246a −0.214a
Ln (long consult time) 0.003 −0.360c
Ln(regular consult time) −0.852a −0.377c
Coefficient significant at: a < 0.001; b < 0.01; c < 0.05
Table 2 Efficiency scores using an exponential distribution
Variable name Efficiency- visits Efficiency- patients seen
Mean Efficiency (sd) min-max Mean Efficiency (sd) min-max
All (165) 0.722 (0.182) 0.042 - 0.933 0.724 (0.168) 0.046- 0.936
FFS (16) 0.632 (0.308) 0.042 - 0.887 0.611 (0.282) 0.054 - 0.893
FHG (38) 0.736 (0.162) 0.279 - 0.913 0.707 (0.162) 0.340 - 0.921
Blended Capitation (53) 0.738 (0.124) 0.419 - 0.933 0.752 (0.109) 0.387 - 0.936
Salaried (6) 0.647 (0.326) 0.062 - 0.874 0.674 (0.314) 0.046 - 0.873
FHT (52) 0.740 (0.163) 0.046 - 0.929 0.738 (0.155) 0.126 – 0.912
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lower socio-economic status (28.9 % in the lowest in-
come quintile and only 7.8 % in the highest income
quintile).
Physicians may have different resources. We examined
the survey data on the FTE counts of administrative staff
(manager, medical secretaries) as well as health care pro-
viders (nurses, social workers, etc.) and found that the
differences followed the primary care models as ex-
pected in that FHTs had more employed staff overall.
We did not observe a relationship between the duration
of the visits and the number of employees. FFS and FHG
physicians had the lowest number of other providers. A
sensitivity analysis with the FTE counts of the employee
types was conducted and no added variables were sig-
nificant. However, there was a lower response on these
variables, resulting in a reduced sample size.
In the efficiency analyses, the differences in the hours
spent on direct care and the duration of the visits are
controlled for. The results show that the efficiency var-
ied greatly among the sample of primary care physicians
(5 % to 94 % efficient). Despite having higher numbers
of visits, physicians paid though FFS (including FHG)
had lower average efficiency scores than capitated physi-
cians and physicians working in FHTs. FFS physicians
had on average the lowest efficiency scores when con-
trolling for confounders.
Although our results are different from those of a previ-
ous study on efficiency of primary care physicians in On-
tario [21], the difference can be explained by the different
methodology. Milliken et al. [21] used data reported from
physicians instead of administrative databases for the out-
puts and for patient characteristics and they did not include
any data on the duration of consultations, and they used
FTE counts instead of the numbers of hours spent on dir-
ect patient care for the physician inputs.
Our results are aligned with those from Gaynor & Pauly
[9]. In the model that Gaynor & Pauly developed and em-
pirically tested, financial incentives increased the productiv-
ity of physicians in terms of the number of services
provided, but the effect was achieved through physicians’
greater effort (i.e., working longer hours). The financial in-
centives did not affect the efficiency of physicians, when
adjusting for effort, by using the number of hours spent on
direct patient care.
From a policy perspective, one would need to consider
what the desired outcomes of care are. A public health in-
surer such as the Ontario government aims to provide ac-
cess to comprehensive care to all. Although FFS physicians
may not be more efficient, they do provide more services
by working longer hours. The higher numbers of visits in
FFS and FHG physicians could be desirable if they reflected
higher access to services. However, these numbers may also
reflect unnecessary visits that could be substituted with
other forms of care. For example, renewal of some
prescriptions can be done electronically, and patients could
receive a phone call after a test to book an appointment
only when results need to be discussed with the physician,
avoiding visits for normal test results. One of the limita-
tions in this study is that the appropriateness of the visits
could not be measured. Physicians on blended capitation
and in FHT had fewer visits, but the numbers of patients
seen were similar to those of FFS physicians and their effi-
ciency average scores were higher, which suggests that they
may be substituting some visits with for example phone
calls (not captured in the outputs in this study) or services
with other non-medical providers such as nurses or medical
secretaries that they employ. In the salaried models, physi-
cians had fewer visits and served fewer patients. However,
the durations of the visits were also longer. Longer visit du-
rations may be necessary to deliver comprehensive care to
patients with higher needs. Patients of salaried physicians
seemed to have higher needs, with lower health status and
lower socioeconomic status.
We were unable to identify a comprehensive measure of
quality in our databases and therefore quality of primary
care was not directly assessed in the present study. Some
studies on efficiency of primary care physicians did have
indicators of quality and found a trade-off between quality
and efficiency [51]. Although it cannot be assumed that
better quality of care requires more time [52–55], a num-
ber of studies found a positive association between longer
visits and various aspects of the quality of care such as
higher patient satisfaction [56, 57] and with higher patient
participation in decision making [58]. Longer visits have
also been associated with higher provision of preventive
services, higher levels of health education, and higher like-
lihood of screening [57, 59–62]. Hence, adjusting for visit
duration in our study is highly relevant as longer visits
may in part reflect the delivery of more comprehensive
services within the visit, and may be comparable to having
multiple shorter visits.
A limitation of the study is the self-selection of physicians
into the QUALICOPC study. The distribution across
models in our sample is quite similar, albeit with a higher
proportion of physicians from FHTs (31 % in our sample vs
22 % in the overall population of primary care physicians)
and a lower proportion of physicians in blended capitation
models (30 % in our sample vs 42 %) [41]. In terms of
socio-demographic characteristics, the physician sample
was somewhat different from the Ontario physician
population in terms of proportion who were female
(56.1 % in our study vs 37.5 %), mean age (49.3 vs
51.1), and being foreign-trained (19.7 % vs 28.3 %).
The patient characteristics by model were similar to
what others have found for the overall Ontario popu-
lation [63]. We also examined whether physician
characteristics differed across models in terms of age
and gender and there were no statistical differences.
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Conclusion
The efficiency scores reported in this study, with an
average of 0.72, can be considered low and raise
questions about possible avenues to increase the effi-
ciency of physicians in the delivery of primary care.
Overall the efficiency scores were relatively similar
across the primary care models and for the two out-
put measures. However, there was a high variation
within each model and overall, which also indicates
that there are gains in efficiency to be made across
all physician practice models. Primary care have other
objectives than maximizing the volume of services
and future efficiency analyses should aim to better
measure the marginal product of various forms of
physician effort (such as coordinating care with other
providers, or phone calls and email communications)
on patients’ access to primary care services and on
patient health.
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